Game Theory Evolving

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Gintis, Herbert

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ISBN:9780691140513
Editorial: Princeton University Press
Fecha de la edición:2009
Número de la edición: 2
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Dimensiones: 0 cm x 0 cm
Nº Pág.:390
Idiomas:Ingles,Inglés

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/ Economía Cuantitativa

Since its original publication in 2000, "Game Theory Evolving" has been considered the best textbook on evolutionary game theory. This completely revised and updated second edition of "Game Theory Evolving" contains new material and shows students how to apply game theory to model human behavior in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality and individuality. The textbook continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, and the connection between biology and economics. Recognizing that students learn by doing, the textbook introduces principles through practice. Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human and animal behavior. The second edition includes solutions to the problems presented and information related to agent-based modeling. In addition, the textbook incorporates instruction in using mathematical software to solve complex problems. "Game Theory Evolving" is perfect for graduate and upper-level undergraduate economics students, and is a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences. It is a revised and updated edition relevant for courses across disciplines.

Ch. 1 Probability Theory 1
Ch. 2 Bayesian Decision Theory 18
Ch. 3 Game Theory: Basic Concepts 32
Ch. 4 Eliminating Dominated Strategies 52
Ch. 5 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 80
Ch. 6 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 116
Ch. 7 Principal-Agent Models 162
Ch. 8 Signaling Games 179
Ch. 9 Repeated Games 201
Ch. 10 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 229
Ch. 11 Dynamical Systems 247
Ch. 12 Evolutionary Dynamics 270
Ch. 13 Markov Economies and Stochastic Dynamical Systems 297
Ch. 14 Table of Symbols 319
Ch. 15 Answers 321
Sources for Problems 373
References 375
Index 385