Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement uses a law and economics approach to analyse whether competition and public procurement laws in Europe, and Asia deal effectively with bid rigging conspiracies. Stefan Weishaar explores the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of bid rigging cartels. The study sheds light on one of the vital issues for achieving cost-effective public procurement - which is itself a critical question in the context of the global financial crisis. The book comprehensively examines whether different laws deal effectively with bid rigging and the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such cartels. The employed industrial economics and auction theory highlight shortcomings of the law in all three jurisdictions - the European Union, China and Japan - and seek to raise awareness of decision and policy makers of when extra precautionary measures against bid rigging conspiracies should be taken. Students and researchers who have a keen interest in the relationship between law and economics, competition law and public procurement law will find this topical book invaluable. Practitioners can see how economic theory can be used to identify situations that lend themselves to bid rigging and policymakers will be informed about the short comings of existing legislation from a law and economics perspective and will be inspired by approaches taken in different jurisdictions.
1. Introduction Part I: Economic Theory 2. Economic Theory on Optimal Deterrence and Enforcement 3. Industrial Economics 4. Auction Theory and Collusion Part II: Legal Analysis 5. Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in the EU 6. Europe: Auction Theory Application 7. Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in China 8. China: Auction Theory Application 9. Effectiveness of the Legal Regime Applicable to Bid Rigging in Japan 10. The Japanese Construction Sector 11. Limits of Economic Theories and Concluding Remarks Appendix References
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