This authoritative and in-depth collection presents seminal papers from leading academics in the field of organisation and bureaucracy. It encompasses sections on organisational boundaries, neo-Schumpeterian theories, hierarchy and international organisation, organisational culture and behaviour, power politics and authority as well as organisational institutions and practices. Professor Jackson has chosen works which have shaped the views of how the economics of organisation and bureaucracy are viewed today and has included papers from conflicting ends of the spectrum to illustrate the fluid and evolving nature of the subject. This indispensable volume, with an original introduction by the editor, will be of immense value to students, scholars and practitioners interested in this topical and relevant field.
Contents: Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction Peter M. Jackson PART I CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS 1. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), 'Of the Division of Labour' and 'Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour' 2. Philip Selznick (1948), 'Foundations of the Theory of Organization' 3. Luther Gulick (1937), 'Notes on the Theory of Organization' 4. Ronald Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm' 5. Herbert A. Simon (1951), 'A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship' 6. Robert Gibbons (2005), 'Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?' PART II ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES 7. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration' 8. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm' 9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations' 10. Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts (1998), 'The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited' 11. Benjamin Klein (2007), 'The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body - General Motors' 12. Herbert A. Simon (1991), 'Organizations and Markets' 13. Filipe M. Santos and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (2005), 'Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization' PART III PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 14. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization' 15. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure' 16. Eugene F. Fama (1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' 17. Stephen A. Ross (1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem' 18. James A. Mirrlees (1976), 'The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization' 19. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability' PART IV AGENCY AND PERFORMANCE 20. Bengt Holmstrom (1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams' 21. Robert Gibbons (2005), 'Incentives Between Firms (and Within)' 22. George P. Baker (1992), 'Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement' 23. Hideshi Itoh (1991), 'Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations' 24. W. Bentley MacLeod (1997), 'Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement' 25. Margaret A. Meyer and John Vickers (1997), 'Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives' PART V NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN THEORIES 26. Sidney G. Winter (2006), 'Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm' 27. F.A. von Hayek (1937), 'Economics and Knowledge' 28. Nicolai J. Foss (2002), '"Coase vs Hayek": Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy' 29. Kenneth J. Arrow (1975), 'Vertical Integration and Communication' 30. Richard P. Rumelt (1984), 'Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm' 31. D. Teece and G. Pisano (1994), 'The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction' 32. Anna Grandori (2001), 'Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm' Volume II Acknowledgements An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I PART I MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE 1. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), 'The Economics of Governance' 2. Jean Tirole (2001), 'Corporate Governance' 3. Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar (2003), 'Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies' 4. Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1991), 'The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations' PART II CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS 5. Jacques Cremer (1995), 'Arm's Length Relationships' 6. Claude Menard (2004), 'The Economics of Hybrid Organizations' 7. Walter W. Powell (1990), 'Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization' 8. George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2008), 'Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between "Islands of Conscious Power"' PART III HIERARCHY AND INTERNAL ORGANISATION 9. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), 'Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy' 10. Jean Geanakoplos and Paul Milgr
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