Martin Ricketts, a leading scholar in this field, has selected the seminal papers from a variety of traditions that illustrate the evolution of thinking on 'the firm' over a considerable period of time. The firm as a vehicle for entrepreneurial initiative and the exercise of business judgement is contrasted throughout with the firm as a policing mechanism in response to known contractual hazards. The selection is in three volumes that cover respectively the general theoretical background; the ownership and scope of the firm - its degree of vertical and transnational integration; and, agency issues relating to employee incentives and the control of managers. This authoritative collection will provide a valuable reference, of interest to students, postgraduates and professional economists seeking an overview of the subject and its evolution.
Contents:Volume I: Transaction Costs, Property Rights and the EntrepreneurAcknowledgementsIntroduction Martin RickettsPART I TRANSACTIONS COSTS, THE MARKET AND THE FIRM1. Frank H. Knight (1921), 'Enterprise and Profit'2. R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm'3. Fritz Machlup (1967), 'Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial'4. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization'5. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations'6. Oliver E. Williamson (1981), 'The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes'7. Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert D. Tollison (1980), 'Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation'8. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1987), 'Reflections on the Theory of the Firm'PART II THE ENTREPRENEUR9. Alfred Marshall ([1925]1953), 'Industrial Organization, Continued. Business Management'10. Joseph A. Schumpeter (1950), 'Crumbling Walls'11. Israel M. Kirzner (1973), 'The Entrepreneur'12. B.J. Loasby (1982), 'The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory'13. Ulrich Witt (1987), 'How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness'14. Nicolai Juul Foss (1993), 'Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives'15. Mark Casson (2000), 'An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm'PART III PRINCIPAL AND AGENT16. Kenneth J. Arrow (1985), 'The Economics of Agency'17. Steven Shavell (1979), 'Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship'18. Martin Ricketts (1986), 'The Geometry of Principal and Agent: Yet Another Use for the Edgeworth Box'19. Harold Demsetz (1995), 'Agency and Nonagency Explanations of the Firm's Organization'PART IV PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE FIRM20. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration'21. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm'22. Oliver Hart (1995), 'Established Theories of the Firm' and 'The Property Rights Approach'23. Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts (1998), 'The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited'Name IndexVolume II: Ownership and ScopeAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume IPART I OWNERSHIP OF THE FIRM1. Adam Gifford, Jr. (1991), 'A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm'2. Henry Hansmann (1996), 'A Theory of Enterprise Ownership'3. Benjamin Ward (1958), 'The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism'4. Eirik G. Furubotn (1988), 'Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A Property-Rights Analysis'5. Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear (1992), 'Peer Pressure and Partnerships'6. Henry Hansmann (1987), 'Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization'7. Edwin G. West (1989), 'Nonprofit Organizations: Revised Theory and New Evidence'PART II THE SCOPE OF THE FIRMA The Franchise Contract8. Paul H. Rubin (1978), 'The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract'9. G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), 'The Economics of Franchise Contracts'10. Robert E. Martin (1988), 'Franchising and Risk Management'11. Antony W. Dnes (1992), '"Unfair" Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts'12. Alanson P. Minkler (1992), 'Why Firms Franchise: A Search Cost Theory'B Vertical Integration13. Kenneth J. Arrow (1975), 'Vertical Integration and Communication'14. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process'15. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), 'Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration'16. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber (2000), 'The Fable of Fisher Body'17. Ronald Coase (2006), 'The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors'18. Benjamin Klein (2007), 'The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body-General Motors'19. John M. Vernon and Daniel A. Graham (1971), 'Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Inte
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