As the European Union moved in the 1990s to a unified market and stronger common institutions, most observers assumed that the changes would reduce corruption. Aspects of the stronger EU promised to preclude - or at least reduce - malfeasance: regulatory harmonization, freer trade, and privatization of publicly owned enterprises. Market efficiencies would render corrupt practices more visible and less common.
In The Best System Money Can But, Carolyn M. Warner systemically and often entertainingly gives the lie to these assumptions and provides a framework for understanding the persistence of corruption in the Western states of the EU. In compelling case studies, she shows that under certain conditions, politicians and firms across Europe chose to counter the increased competition they faced due to liberal markets and political reforms by resorting to corruption. More elections have made ever-larger funding demands on political parties; privatization has proved to be a theme park for economic crime and party profit; firms and politicians collude in many areas where EU harmonization has resulted in a net reduction in law-enforcement powers; and state-led "export promotion" efforts, especially in the armaments, infrastructure, and energy sectors, have virtually institutionalized bribery.
1 Corruption dynamics in the European Union 14
2 Does competition in the European Union corrupt? 30
3 "Corruption is our friend" : exporting graft in infrastructure, arms, and oil 54
4 The myth of the market : privatization 85
5 Decentralization, democracy, and graft 107
6 The corruption of campaign and party financing 135
7 The pathologies of an international organization 159
8 The European Union, the international political economy, and corruption 175
App. 1 Key dead men 191
App. 2 Brief survey of the European Union 195
App. 3 The major institutions of the European Union 197