Competition policy aims to prevent anticompetitive agreements and mergers, limiting the abusive exercise of market power. The formulation and application of this policy presents significant challenges, which include showing that proposed mergers are anticompetitive, proving that firms are members of cartels and defending apparently restrictive vertical agreements. For this insightful volume, the editor has selected key papers which illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive developmental coverage of the theory that underpins and justifies competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations. This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject.
Introduction by George Norman
Pt. I Setting the Scene: The Case for Antitrust Policy
1 The Case for Antitrust Enforcement by Jonathan B. Baker 3
2 Abuse of Market Power by John Vickers 27
Pt. II Theory of Price Fixing
3 Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion? by Barbara McCutcheon 47
4 Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case by David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullen 68
5 Optimal Collusion with Private Information by Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell 88
6 Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. 126
Pt. III The Impact of Price Fixing
7 Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding by Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona 153
8 The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction "Knockouts" by John E. Kwoka, Jr. 179
9 "Our Customers Are Our Enemies": The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995 by John M. Connor 193
10 Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe? by Lawrence J. White 219
Pt. IV Cartels
11 Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms by George Symeonidis 221
12 What Determines Cartel Success? by Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow 235
13 Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution by Massimo Motta and Michele Polo 288
Pt. V Horizontal Mergers
14 Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis by Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro 323
15 Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences by David Spector 343
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