The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory offers a comprehensive analysis of the field, discussing foundational topics that are at the core of applied game theory. It highlights the nuances that scientific experiments have delivered to our understanding of strategic interactions among decision makers.
Leading experts explore methodological considerations and games of complete and incomplete information to offer new directions for research in experimental game theory. Chapters demonstrate transformative behavioral research focused on classic topics in game theory such as cooperation and coordination games. Taking a scientific approach to the study of game theory, this innovative Handbook provides an insight into laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggests new ways of modeling strategic behavior. It takes a forward-thinking position, addressing the challenges inherent in innovations surrounding the measurement of strategic behavior using experimental methods.
This Handbook will prove to be a valuable resource for scholars and students who are looking to gain a broader understanding of experimental game theory and how to contribute to its advancement. It will also be of particular interest to researchers in experimental and behavioral economics.
Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory 1
C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. Rosenblat
PART I A SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
1 Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal response
equilibrium 8
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey
2 The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models 48
Peter G. Moffatt
3 The process of choice in games 69
Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov
4 Games with continuous-time experimental protocols 95
Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson
5 Bargaining in the field 125
Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie
PART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION
6 Recent advances in experimental coordination games 149
David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber
7 Public goods, norms and cooperation 184
Marie Claire Villeval
8 Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system 213
Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari
9 Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations 241
Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso
10 Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games 256
Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan
11 Reciprocity in games with unknown types 271
Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride
12 Behavioral rules 289
Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier
PART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
13 Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoretical
foundations 311
Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim
14 Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results 348
César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey
15 Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey 376
Jens Großer
16 Experiments in market design 399
Siqi Pan
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