Game Theory for Applied Econometricians "Data Analytics with R"

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Adams, Christopher P.

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pvp.124,95 €

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ISBN:9781032398334
Editorial: Crc Press Inc.
Fecha de la edición:2025
Encuadernación:
Nº Pág.:280
Idiomas:Inglés

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/ Economía Cuantitativa

Over the last 30 years the practice and use of game theory has changed dramatically, yet textbooks continue to present game theory with algebraic formalism and toy models. This book, on the other hand, illustrates game theory concepts using real-world data and analyses problems with real policy implications. The focus is on applying current learning to real world problems by providing an introduction to game theory and econometric analysis based on game theoretic principles using the computer language R.

The book covers the standard topics of an introductory game theory course including dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium. It layers on top of this an approach to statistics and econometrics called Structural Modeling. In this approach, key parameter estimates rely upon game theoretic analysis. The real-world examples used to illustrate these concepts vary in scope and include an analysis of bargaining between hospitals and insurers, equilibrium entry of retail tire stores, bid rigging in timber auctions and contracts in 19th century whaling.

This book is aimed at the general reader with the equivalent of a bachelors degree in economics, statistics or some more technical field. The book could be used as a text for an upper level undergraduate course or a lower level graduate course in economics or business.

Introduction Part I. Static Games of Complete Information 1. Games 2. Nash Equilibrium 3. Oligopoly 4. Empirical Entry Games 5. Mixed Strategies Part II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information 6. Dynamic Games 7. Repeated Games 8. Bargaining Part III. Static Games of Incomplete Information 9. Bayes Nash Equilibrium 10. Auctions 11. Auctions with Affiliated Valuations Part IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 12. Moral Hazard 13. Adverse Selection Bibliography