This is an introductory game theory book that quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of game theory to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts. The book is linear, as the chapters are not independent. Readers should be able to build simple game theoretic models after chapter 3. Each subsequent chapter adds another feature to the readers model-building repertoire.
1.Models and Games
INTRODUCTION TO MODELING
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
EXAMPLES OF GAMES
RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION
1.Player Preferences
ORDINAL UTILITIES
VON NEUMANNMORGENSTERN
UTILITIES
CONSTRUCTING UTILITIES
DETERMINING RISK
1.Simultaneous Play
STRATEGIC GAMES
FINAL JEOPARDY
MIXED STRATEGIES
NONMATRIX
MODELS
LIMITATIONS
1.Bilateral Agreements
NEGOTIATIONS
BARGAINING IN STRATEGIC GAMES
FAIRNESS PROPERTIES
1.Sequential Play
SEQUENTIAL GAMES
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA
COMBINATORIAL GAMES
MORAL HAZARD
1.Missing Information
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
ROMANS AND GERMANS
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
AUCTIONS
1.Repetitious Play
REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMAS
MODELING NOISE
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
1.Multilateral Agreements
SHAPLEY ARGUMENT
NUCLEOLUS ARGUMENT
BARGAINING ARGUMENT
VOTING POWER
1.Resource Allocation
RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
BARGAINING AND COALITION MODELS
COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS
CONCLUDING REMARKS
