This intermediate-level undergraduate textbook in environmental economics builds on the microeconomics courses students take in their first year. It intentionally does not survey the whole field or present every possible topic. Instead, there is a clear focus on the theory of environmental policy and its practical applications. Most of the applied parts of the book deal with the economics of environmental policy in the European Union and in the United States. The book combines basic environmental economic analysis, such as the internalization of externalities, with recent developments in this field, including induced technical change and coalition theory. Moreover, topics from daily policy debates such as global warming are put into economic perspective. This is done in an intelligible form for advanced undergraduate students of economics, business administration and related fields. Each part of the book contains a set of exercises and suggested solutions
Preface
Acknowledgments
Part One: The Internalization of Externalities as a Central Theme of Environmental Policy 1
A Foundations 1
I Object and Methods of Microeconomic Theory 1
II The Equilibrium Concept in Microeconomic Theory 5
III The "Social Optimality" of Market Equilibrium in the Ideal-Type Economic Model 9
IV Divergences between Equilibrium and Social Optimum Due to Externalities: The Problem of "Market Failure" 14
V The Internalization of Externalities to "Restore" the "Lost" Optimality of Market Equilibrium 19
B Implications of Making the Concept of Internalization Programmatic in Environmental Policy 22
I The Principle of Consumer Sovereignty 22
II Ordinality and Cardinality of the Concept of Utility: Willingness to Pay as an Approximation 23
III From Individual Utility to Social Welfare: The Aggregation Problem 24
IV Consequences 25
V Nonetheless: Internalization of Externalities as an Indispensable Component of an Environmental Policy Vision 27
Exercises 29
Part Two: Strategies for Internalizing Externalities 32
A Negotiations 32
I The Coase Theorem 32
II Critique and Extensions of the Coase Theorem 38
1 Distribution and Allocation 38
2 The Bilateral Monopoly between Negotiating Parties 41
3 Polluters and Victims as Heterogeneous Groups: The Prisoner's Dilemma Proble