Vijay Krishna's 2e of "Auction Theory" improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. It focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions. It includes a new chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications. It also includes new LaTex Beamer slides, chapter-ending exercises, problems of varying difficulties, and a solutions manual support and reinforce key points.
1 Introduction 1
2 Private ValueAuctions:A First Look 11
3 The Revenue Equivalence Principle 27
4 Qualifications and Extensions 37
5 Mechanism Design 61
6 Auctions with Interdependent Values 85
7 The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle 105
8 Asymmetries and Other Complications 113
9 Efficiency and the English Auction 129
10 Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values 145
11 Bidding Rings 157
12 An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions 173
13 Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values 185
14 Some Revenue Considerations 203
15 Sequential Sales 213
16 Nonidentical Objects 227
17 Packages and Positions 239
18 Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values 251
A Continuous Distributions 269
B Stochastic Orders 275
C Order Statistics 281
D Affiliated Random Variables 285
E Some Linear Algebra 289
F Games of Incomplete Information 295
G Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions 299
Bibliography 305