It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics. Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University
The material is self-contained presuming no prior knowlede by the reader other than elementary microeconomics and calculus...the presentation is rigorous without being overly technical. The authors make excellent use of time-lines and diagrams supplement the formal analysis...All audiences will appreciate the extensive references to the literature as well as the numerous problem sets at the end of the chapters. Stefan Reicheistein, Journal of Economics
Although written for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business and for advanced undergraduates with its wide range of applications discussed from such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, tehnology transfer, labour economics, and health economics, this book provides also an excellent survey for the general reader interested in the latest developments in this field. Beate Reszat, The Economic Journal
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each chapter.
Readership: Graduate students of economics, with some advanced undergraduate potential. A core text for courses on the economics of information; supplementary reading for general microeconomics and industrial organization courses.
1 Introduction
2 The Base Model
3 The Moral Hazard Problem
4 The Adverse Selection Problem
5 Signalling
Mathematical Appendix
Additional Exercises
