This book combines economic theory and design to create tools that economists can use to apply in social, political and institutional application. Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin, Roger B. Myerson all won the Nobel prize this year (recently announced) on this topic. Their work was citied 'for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory'. This book combines the discipline of microeconomic theory with the application technique of design. Combined this gives both students and practitioners tools to better understand social economics and predict what change can bring. Reviewers confirm the book can work for advanced undergraduate economics courses. Through the authors research they found 120 courses throughout undergrad and grad programs that would use this book (microeconomics covering topic of incentives.) The author is currently using these materials to teach undergraduates at Temple University. This book is being co written with 4 students in both graduate and PhD programs. As a result it will have both rigor and accessibility, making its application and adoption to the student market more likely. It provides readers with the tools to design the rules of economics to harness the power of incentives.
1 Introduction 1 <br />2 Dominant strategy implementation 38 <br />3 Implementation in Nash equilibria 58 <br />4 Bayesian equilibrium and mechanisms 81 <br />5 Refined Nash implementation 107 <br />6 Applications 132 <br />7 Bayesian implementation 158 <br />8 Further topics in mechanism design 172 <br />9 Matching models 202 <br />10 Empirical evidence on mechanisms 228 <br />A Mathematics review and more on economic domains 254 <br /> Notation 276 <br /> Bibliography 278 <br /> Index 288 <br />
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