In this book, former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the case of Greece. Greece was the first Eurozone country to face an enormous deficit, which reached 15% of GDP in 2009. As the Greek crisis unfolded, other Eurozone countries displayed identical symptoms, albeit in varying degrees of severity. From a strictly Greek predicament the debt crisis quickly turned into a problem for the European Union as a whole. This first English language translation investigates the causes of this spillover and chronicles the policy responses to combat it. It also discusses Greece's troubled political economy, the country's difficulties in adjusting to the demands of its creditors and the vehement social and political reactions to the policy of austerity. Through his comprehensive and authoritative analysis, Simitis provides valuable insights into the crucial interconnection between Greece's own economic troubles and the wider European search for macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth. As such, the book appeals well beyond those with a narrow academic interest in Greece. This is very much a discussion about the future of the Eurozone and the European Union as a whole.
Preface Part I: How we arrived at this first Memorandum 1. Was Greece ready for the Euro? 2. New Democracy's criminal indifference 3. PASOK's opportunistic optimism 4. Being in denial 5. Ineffective solutions 6. The bitter truth 7. The first Memorandum: a medicine with dangerous side effects Part II: The Memorandum's first year of implementation 8. The crisis spreads to the Union 9. Implementing the Memorandum: an obstacle race 10. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in the Eurozone? 11. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in Greece? 12. A year of the Memorandum: seeking a new solution Part III: Debt restructuring and power games 13. Debt restructuring: The decisions of 21st July 14. A dead end 15. More hitches 16. The new solution 17. Political games with unpredictable consequences Part IV: Coalition government, psi, second Memorandum 18. A flicker of hope 19. Conflicts at the highest European level 20. The new agreement with the Eurozone (Memorandum II), the PSI 21. An evaluation of the Memorandum(s) 22. Austerity and growth: implementing the decisions of 21st February 2012 23. The crisis peaks Part V: Elections May-June 2012 24. Elections of 6th May: Euro or drachma? 25. Cracks in the Euro 26. The Union at a dead end: change of course on 29th June 27. The elections of 17th June: a new beginning? 28. Provisional solutions. October 2012-June 2013 29. The evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece 30. Cyprus Part VI: The future of Greece and the European Union 31. The causes of the crisis are not only economic 32. A new European policy is necessary A. Economic governance B. Inclusion and participation Appendix: Key meetings and decisions of the institutions of the European Union relating to the financial crisis Note. The main Greek political parties Figure 1: Net borrowing of Greek government and economy (% of GDP) Figure 2: Greece. Primary expenditure, expenditure, revenue 1988-2014 Abbreviations Index
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