This is the first volume in a new, definitive, six-volume edition of the works of Joseph Stiglitz, one of today's most distinguished and controversial economists. Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 for his work on asymmetric information and is widely acknowledged as one of the pioneers in the field of modern information economics and more generally for his contributions to microeconomics. Volume I includes a number of classic papers which helped to form the foundations for the field of the economics of information. Stiglitz reflects on his work and the field more generally throughout the volume by including substantial original introductions to the Selected Works, the volume as a whole, and each part within the volume. The volume includes a number of foundational papers, specifically looking at market equilibrium with adverse selection, moral hazard, and screening. This volume sets out the basic concepts underlying the economics of information, while volume II goes a step further by applying and extending these concepts in a number of different settings in labour, capital, and product markets.
Preface to the Selected Works; Introduction to Volume I; I. PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMATION ANALYSIS; 1. Information and Economic Analysis; 2. Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics; IIA. THE GENERAL THEORY OF SCREENING; 3. The Theory of "Screening", Education and the Distribution of Income; 4. A Model of Employment Outcome Illustrating the Effect of the Structure of Information on the Level and Distribution of Income; IIB. THEORY OF SELF-SELECTION; Introduction to Section IIB; 5. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information; 6. Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later; 7. Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing, and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market; 8. Prices and Queues as Screening Devices in Competitive Markets; 9. Sorting Out the Differences Between Screening and Signaling Models; IIC. THEORY OF ADVERSE SELECTION, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND CREDIT RATIONING; Introduction to Section IIC; 10. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information; 11. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device; 12. The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality Prices; III THEORY OF INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION; 13. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping; 14. Information, Competition, and Markets; 15. Human Fallibility and Economic Organization; 16. The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard; 17. Credit Markets and the Control of Capital; 18. Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets; IV. INFORMATION AND PRICES; Introduction to Section IV; 19. Information and Competitive Price Systems; 20. Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion; 21. On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets; 22. A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information; V. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION; Introduction to Section V; 23. Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets; 24. Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring; VI. INFORMATION AND MACRO-ECONOMICS; Introduction to Section VI; 25. Informational Imperfections in the Capital Markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations; 26. Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles
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