It is often argued that whilst France has been the driving force behind European integration, Britain remains an awkward partner in the project, even after entering the EEC in 1973. Nowhere is this contrast clearer than in the field of European monetary integration, as has recently been shown by the difference in the two countries' policies towards the Euro. However, Daisuke Ikemoto reveals that the successive governments of Britain, both Conservative and Labour, were much keener to participate in the early stages of European monetary integration than previously thought. In fact, Britain and France pursued broadly similar policies on the issue until the end of the 1970s, and the common interests of the two countries in international monetary affairs were the background to the Anglo-French entente during the period. Based on an extensive survey of archival sources, this book is the first systematic analysis of why Britain and France parted company on European monetary integration.
Introduction National Political Parties and Party Systems in the Studies of European Integration Britain's Policy on EMU during the Entry Negotiation with the EEC, 1970-71 Britain and the EEC's First Steps towards EMU, 1971-74 Comparing British and French Policy on the Establishment of the EMS, 1976-79 (1): The Currency Crisis of 1976 Comparing British and French policy on the Establishment of the EMS, 1976-79 (2): The Parting of the Ways, 1978-79 Conclusion